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The Budget 2009 Tax Proposals and Activity in the UK 
Continental Shelf (UKCS) 
 
Professor Alexander G. Kemp 
and 
Linda Stephen 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Budget 2009 several proposals were made to modify the tax system 
applied to the UKCS.  Important ones are as follows: 
1. A value allowance (termed field allowance) is to be applied to new 
fields as follows: 
(a) the field allowance for small fields is £75 million for fields with oil 
reserves (or gas equivalent) of 2.75 million tonnes or less, reducing 
on a straight line basis to nil for fields over 3.5 million tonnes.  In any 
one year the maximum field allowance (for a field with total 
allowance of £75 million) is £15 million. 
(b) the field allowance for ultra heavy oil fields is £800 million for fields 
with an American Petroleum Institute gravity below 18 degrees and a 
viscosity of more than 50 centipoise at reservoir temperature and 
pressure.  In any one year the maximum field allowance is £160 
million. 
(c) the field allowance for ultra high temperature/pressure fields is £800 
million for fields with a temperature of more than 176.67 degree 
Celsius and pressure of more than 1034 bar in the reservoir formation.  
In any one year the maximum field allowance is £160 million. 
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2. With respect to chargeable gains under the current law as it applies to 
ring fence the position is as follows: 
(a) where companies swap UK or UKCS licence interests post 
development, a chargeable gain can potentially arise, 
(b) where ring fence assets are disposed of, and the proceeds reinvested 
in other ring fence assets, the chargeable gain arising from the 
disposal can be ‘held over’ for up to 10 years before coming into 
charge. 
The new rules for the calculation of chargeable gains will: 
(a) provide that no chargeable gains arise on the swap of UK/UKCS 
licences, to the extent that the value of one licence matches another 
that it has been swapped for, bringing the treatment of developed 
assets in line with undeveloped ones: and 
(b) provide that where the proceeds from the disposal of a chargeable 
asset in the ring fence are reinvested in another chargeable ring fence 
asset, no chargeable gain will arise. 
3. With respect to PRT licence expiry, under the current law, companies 
cannot access PRT relief for decommissioning costs which occur more 
than 12 months after they have ceased to be a licence holder in respect 
of a taxable field. 
 
The new rules will: 
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(a) allow companies decommissioning relief where they cease to be a 
participator in a field because a licence has expired, 
(b) ensure that any income that may arise in respect of the assets in 
question will also be chargeable to PRT. 
 
In this paper the effects of the new field allowance are examined in detail.  
Comments are also made on the other proposals and on other tax issues in 
the UKCS not addressed in Budget 2009. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
 
The projections of production and expenditures have been made through 
the use of financial simulation modelling, including the use of the Monte 
Carlo technique, informed by a large, recently-updated, field database 
validated by the relevant operators.  The field database incorporates key, 
best estimate information on production, and investment, operating and 
decommissioning expenditures.  These refer to over 300 sanctioned 
fields, 131 incremental projects relating to these fields, 35 probable 
fields, and 16 possible fields.  All these are as yet unsanctioned but are 
currently being examined for development.  An additional database 
contains 234 fields defined as being in the category of technical reserves.  
Summary data on reserves (oil/gas) and block location are available for 
these.  They are not currently being examined for development by 
licensees. 
 
Monte Carlo modelling was employed to estimate the possible numbers 
of new discoveries in the period to 2030.  The modelling incorporated 
assumptions based on recent trends relating to exploration effort, success 
rates, sizes, and types (oil, gas, condensate) of discovery.  A moving 
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average of the behaviour of these variables over the past 5 years was 
calculated separately for 6 areas of the UKCS (Southern North Sea, 
(SNS), Central North Sea (CNS), Moray Firth (MF), Northern North Sea 
(NNS), West of Scotland (WOS), and Irish Sea (IS)), and the results 
employed for use in the Monte Carlo analysis.  Because of the very 
limited data for WOS and IS over the period judgemental assumptions on 
success rates and average sizes of discoveries were made for the 
modelling. 
 
It is postulated that the exploration effort depends substantially on a 
combination of (a) the expected success rate, (b) the likely size of 
discovery, and (c) oil/gas prices.  In the present study 3 future oil/gas 
price scenarios were employed as follows: 
 
Table 1 
Future Oil and Gas Price Scenarios 
 Oil Price (real) 
$/bbl 
Gas Price (real) 
pence/therm 
High 80 70 
Medium 60 50 
Low 40 30 
 
 
The postulated numbers of annual exploration wells drilled for the whole 
of the UKCS are as follows for 2009 and 2030: 
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Table 2 
Exploration Wells Drilled 
 2009 2030 
High 45 35 
Medium 40 32 
Low 30 22 
 
The annual numbers are modelled to decline in a linear fashion over the 
period. 
 
It is postulated that success rates depend substantially on a combination 
of (a) recent experience, and (b) size of the effort.  It is further suggested 
that higher effort is associated with more discoveries but with lower 
success rates compared to reduced levels of effort.  This reflects the view 
that low levels of effort will be concentrated on the lowest risk prospects, 
and thus that higher effort involves the acceptance of higher risk.  For the 
UKCS as a whole 3 success rates were postulated as follows with the 
medium one reflecting the average over the past 5 years. 
 
Table 3 
Success Rates for UKCS 
Medium effort/Medium success rate          = 25.5% 
High effort/Low success rate                      = 24% 
Low effort/High success rate                      = 27% 
 
 
It should be noted that success rates have varied considerably across 
sectors of the UKCS. Thus in the CNS and SNS the averages have 
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exceeded 30% while in the other sectors success rates have been well 
below the average for the whole province. 
It is assumed that technological progress will maintain these success rates 
over the time period. 
 
The mean sizes of discoveries made in the historic period for each of the 
6 regions were calculated. They are shown in Table 4.  It was then 
assumed that the mean size of discovery would decrease in line with 
recent historic experience.  Such decline rates are quite modest.   
 
Table 4 
Mean Discovery Size MMboe 
SNS 9 
CNS 25 
NNS 25 
MF 20 
WoS 81 
IS   5 
 
 
For purposes of the Monte Carlo modelling of new discoveries the SD 
was set at 50% of the mean value.  In line with historic experience the 
size distribution of discoveries was taken to be lognormal. 
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Using the above information the Monte Carlo technique was employed to 
project discoveries in the 6 regions to 2030.  For the whole period the 
total numbers of discoveries for the whole of the UKCS were are follows: 
 
 
Table 5 
Total Number of Discoveries to 2030 
High effort/Low success rate                   245 
Medium Effort/Medium Success Rate     238 
Low effort/High success rate                   185 
 
 
For each region the average development costs (per boe) of fields in the 
probable and possible categories were calculated.  These reflect 
substantial cost inflation over the last few years.  Using these as the mean 
values the Monte Carlo technique was employed to calculate the 
development costs of new discoveries.  A normal distribution with a SD = 
20% of the mean value was employed.  For the whole of the UKCS the 
average development costs on this basis were nearly $14/boe with quite a 
wide variation.  Investment costs for boe depend on several factors 
including not only the absolute costs in different operating conditions 
(such as water depth) but on the size of the fields. Thus in the SNS 
development costs were found to average nearly $14 per boe because of 
the small size of field. In the NNS they averaged $16/boe. Operating 
costs over the lifetime of the fields were also calculated, as were the 
decommissioning costs.  Total lifetime field costs (excluding E and A 
costs) were found to average nearly $25 per boe for the whole of the 
UKCS, and averaged over $21 per boe in the SNS, nearly $25 per boe in 
the CNS, and $29 per boe in the NNS. 
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For new discoveries annual operating costs were modelled as a 
percentage of accumulated development costs.  This percentage varied 
according to field size.  It was taken to increase as the size of the field 
was reduced reflecting the presence of economies of scale in the 
exploitation costs. Thus the field lifetime costs in small fields could 
become very high on a per boe basis. 
 
With respect to fields in the category of technical reserves it was 
recognised that many have remained undeveloped for a long time, so the 
mean development costs in each of the basins was set at $5/boe higher 
than the mean for the new discoveries in that basin. Thus for the CNS the 
mean development costs are $17/boe and in NNS $21/boe.  For purposes 
of Monte Carlo modelling a normal distribution of the recoverable 
reserves for each field with a SD = 50% of the mean was assumed.  With 
respect to development costs the distribution was assumed to be normal 
with a SD = 20% of the mean value. 
 
The annual numbers of new field developments were assumed to be 
constrained by the physical and financial capacity of the industry.  This 
subject is currently very pertinent in the UKCS.  The ceilings were 
assumed to be linked to the oil/gas scenarios with maxima of 20, 17, and 
13 respectively under the High, Medium, and Low Price Cases.  These 
constraints do not apply to incremental projects which are additional to 
new field developments. 
  
A noteworthy feature of the 131 incremental projects in the database 
validated by operators is the expectation that the great majority will be 
executed over the next 3 or 4 years.  It is virtually certain that in the 
medium and longer-term many further incremental projects will be 
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designed and executed.  They are just not yet at the serious planning 
stage.  Such projects can be expected not only linked to currently 
sanctioned fields, but also to those presently classified as in the categories 
of probable, possible, technical reserves, and future discoveries. 
 
Accordingly, estimates were made of the potential extra incremental 
projects from all these sources.  Examination of the numbers of such 
projects and their key characteristics (reserves and costs) being examined 
by operators over the past 5 years indicated a decline rate in the volumes.  
On the basis of this, and from a base of the information of the key 
characteristics of the projects in the database, it was felt that, with a 
decline rate reflecting historic experience, further portfolios of 
incremental projects could reasonably be expected.  As noted above such 
future projects would be spread over all categories of host fields.  Their 
sizes and costs reflect recent trends. 
 
The effects of the introduction of the field allowance were modelled 
within the above modelling framework.  The impact of the allowance for 
small fields was given particular attention as it affects many fields. 
 
3. Results 
 
A. Key Effects under Pre-Budget Terms 
 
To put the effects of the budget proposals in perspective summary 
results of the position under the pre-budget terms are shown first in 
Charts 1 – 91 and Table 6. 
                                                 
1 Full results of the pre-budget situation are shown in “The Prospects for Activity in the UKCS to 2035: 
the 2008 Perspective”, North Sea Occasional Study Paper No. 109, by A.G. Kemp and Linda Stephen, 
University of Aberdeen Department of Economics, October 2008, pp. 61. 
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Chart 3 
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Chart 5 
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Chart 7 
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Chart 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
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TOTAL 
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B. Effects of Allowance for Small Fields 
 
The effects of the field allowance for small fields are shown under 
different headings as follows: 
(a) Numbers of New Field Development Triggered to 2035 
 
The numbers of new field developments triggered by the allowance under 
the 3 price scenarios are shown in Charts 10 -12 and in Tables 7 – 9 
which also show the numbers passing and failing the economic hurdle 
under the pre-budget terms.   
 
Chart 10 
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Chart 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 12 
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Table 7 
Potential New Field Development in UKCS 2009-2035 
 
 
$40, 30 pence case 
 Pass Pre-Budget 
2009 
Fail Pre-Budget 
2009 
Triggered by £75m. 
value allowance 
Probable 5 31 4 
Possible 5 10 2 
Technical Reserves 5 148 8 
New Discoveries 48 137 27 
TOTAL 63 326 41 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
 
Potential New Field Development in UKCS 2009-2035 
 
$60, 50 pence case 
 Pass Pre-Budget 
2009 
Fail Pre-Budget 
2009 
Triggered by £75m. 
value allowance 
Probable 28 8 2 
Possible 11 4 2 
Technical Reserves 103 111 24 
New Discoveries 207 31 21 
TOTAL 349 154 49 
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Table 9 
Potential New Field Development in UKCS 2009-2035 
 
$80, 70 pence case 
 Pass Pre-Budget 
2009 
Fail Pre-Budget 
2009 
Triggered by £75m. 
value allowance 
Probable 33 3 1 
Possible 14 1 0 
Technical Reserves 103 23 13 
New Discoveries 207 1 0 
TOTAL 357 28 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are 41 developments triggered under the $40, 30 pence scenario, 49 
under the $60, 50 pence case, and 14 under the $80, 70 pence case.  The 
lower number under the high price case reflects the fact that the great 
majority of fields already pass the hurdle under the pre-budget tax terms.  
Under the low price case a few fields in the probable and possible 
categories are triggered as are more new discoveries.  Very few of fields 
in the category of technical reserves are triggered reflecting their 
relatively high development costs.  Under the $60, 50 pence case 
significant numbers of new discoveries become viable as do a worthwhile 
number of those in the category of technical reserves.  Under the $80, 70 
pence case many more of the high cost fields in the category of technical 
reserves become viable under the pre-budget terms and a worthwhile 
more pass the hurdle after the tax relief. 
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(b)Extra Production Triggered to 2035 
 
The extra oil production triggered by the field allowance for small fields 
is shown in Charts 13 – 15.  Under the $40, 30 pence case the extra oil 
production is very small in the period up to 2021 when it reaches 34,000 
b/d and grows to 50,000 b/d in 2027 and 2028 after which it falls to 
30,000 b/d in 2035.  In the years from 2018 onwards the great majority of 
the increased production comes from new discoveries.  Under the $60, 50 
pence case the extra yearly production never exceeds 24,000 b/d despite 
the fact that more new developments are triggered in this scenario than 
under the lower price case.  This is explained by the lower average size of 
the triggered developments under the $60, 50 pence case.  The larger 
fields often pass the hurdle under the pre-budget tax terms.  It is 
noticeable that a significant proportion of the extra production comes 
from fields in the category of technical reserves under the $60, 50 pence 
case.  Under the $80, 70 pence case the increase in oil production is very 
small as most developments are viable under the pre-budget terms. 
 
Chart 13 
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Chart 14 
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The gas production triggered by the field allowance for small fields is 
shown in Charts 16 – 18.  Under the $40, 30 pence scenario the triggered 
yearly production increases gradually to exceed 100, mmcf/d in 2018 and 
continues to do so until after 2033, reaching peaks of over 140, mmcf/d in 
some years.  Much of the increase comes from fields in the categories of 
new discoveries.  Under the $60, 50 pence case the triggered production 
grows to exceed 150 mmcf/d in 2019 and reaches a maximum of 200 
mmcf/d in 2021.  In this scenario the increase is shared fairly equally 
between fields in the categories of new discoveries and technical 
reserves.  Under the $80, 70 pence case the triggered production grows 
quite rapidly to 100 mmcf/d in 2013 and reaches a peak in 2019 of 140, 
mmcf/d.  Virtually all the triggered production comes from fields in the 
category of technical reserves. 
 
Chart 16 
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Chart 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 18 
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In Charts 19 – 21 the triggered total hydrocarbon production (including 
NGLs) is shown under the $40, 30 pence case.  The average grows fairly 
slowly to reach 40,000 boe/d in 2018, 60,000 boe/d in 2021 and a peak of 
75,000 boe/d in 2027 and 2028.  By 2035 the incremental production falls 
to 40,000 boe/d.  It is noteworthy that most of the extra production 
emanates from fields in the category of new discoveries.  Under the $60, 
50 pence scenario the triggered production increases slowly to 30,000 
boe/d in 2018 and reaches a peak of 58,000 boe/d in 2020.  At 2035 the 
increase is still substantial at 54,000 boe/d.  The longer term increase is 
fairly evenly divided between those in the categories of new discoveries 
and technical reserves.  Under the $80, 70 pence case the triggered 
production is quite small reaching 17,000 boe/d in 2017 and peaking at 
26,000 boe/d in 2020.  For many years the increase is in the 15,000 – 
20,000 boe/d range.  Virtually all the triggered production emanates from 
fields in the category of technical reserves. 
 
Chart 19 
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Chart 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 21 
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Total cumulative triggered hydrocarbon production in the period to 2035 
is shown in Table 10.  Under the $40, 30 pence case the total is 437 
mmboe.  Nearly 80% emanates from fields in the category of new 
discoveries, and only around 10% from fields in the probable and 
possible categories.  Under the $60, 50 pence case the triggered 
production is nearly 360 mmboe.  Of this over 47% comes from each of 
the field categories of new discoveries and technical reserves.  Under the 
$80, 70 pence case the extra production is 140 mmboe of which 97% 
comes from fields in the category of high cost technical reserves. 
 
 
Table 10 
 
Cumulative Triggered Production to 2035 (mmboe) 
 
Fields $40, 30 pence $60, 50 pence $80, 70pence 
Probable 30.99 15.85 3.98 
Possible 11.29 4.33 0.00 
Technical Reserves 45.87 169.38 136.36 
New Discoveries 348.74 169.23 0.00 
TOTAL 436.88 358.79 140.33 
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(c) Extra Field Investment Triggered 
 
The extra field investments triggered to 2035 by the value allowance for 
small fields under three price scenarios are shown on a yearly basis in 
Charts 22 – 24.  Under the $40, 30 pence case the average annual amount 
triggered is nearly £130 million (at 2008 prices).  In the near term there is 
some increase in expenditure on probable and possible developments but 
the main impact comes in later years when many new discoveries are 
developed.  Under the $60, 50 pence price case (Chart 23) the average 
annual increase in field investment is around £170 million (at 2008 
prices).  The increase compared to the low price case is due not only to 
the induced development of a larger number of fields but to the higher 
costs of developing the fields in the technical reserves category.  Under 
the $80, 70 pence case (Chart 24) the annual average increase in field 
investment as around £76 million, nearly all on the high cost fields in the 
technical reserves category.  The lower increase in expenditure compared 
to the $60, 50 pence scenario results from the smaller number of induced 
developments at the high price.  In turn this reflects the fact that most of 
the field developments are viable under the pre-budget tax terms. 
 
In Table 11 the cumulative triggered field investment to 2035 is shown.  
It is seen that under the $40, 30 pence case the total is nearly £3.5 billion 
(at 2008 prices), nearly £4.3 billion under the $60, 50 pence case, and 
nearly £2 billion under the $80, 70 pence case. 
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Chart 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 23 
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Chart 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
 
Cumulative Triggered Development Expenditure to 2035 
£m (2008) 
 
Fields $40, 30 pence $60, 50 pence $80, 70pence 
Probable 264.46 158.89 63.75 
Possible 87.88 61.17 0.00 
Technical Reserves 355.08 2130.06 1824.82 
New Discoveries 2772.11 1911.25 0.00 
TOTAL 3479.53 4261.36 1888.57 
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(d) Extra Field Operating Expenditures Triggered 
 
In Charts 25 – 27 the extra operating expenditures triggered by the value 
allowance for small fields are shown on a yearly basis to 2035.  Under the 
$40, 30 pence case the annual average is around £114 million (at 2008 
prices).  It is seen that the annual expenditure rises gradually to reach a 
peak of over £170 million in the later 2020’s.  Over the whole period 
expenditures on new discoveries accounts for the bulk of the extra 
expenditures.  Under the $60, 50 pence case the average annual increase 
is £150 million (at 2008 prices).  Again the activity rises gradually from 
low levels reflecting the slow build up of the induced field developments.  
Peak annual extra expenditure is £200 million (at 2008 prices) attained in 
2020.  It is seen that the extra expenditure in the longer term is spread 
fairly equally across fields in the categories of new discoveries and 
technical reserves.  Under the $80, 70 pence case the average annual 
induced expenditure is around £80 million (at 2008 prices).  It rises 
gradually to reach a peak of over £130 million in 2019.  Virtually all the 
induced expenditures are on fields in the category of technical reserves. 
 
In Table 12 the cumulative aggregate induced operating expenditures to 
2035 are shown.  Under the $40, 30 pence case the total is £2.85 billion 
(at 2008 prices), £3.75 billion under the $60, 50 pence case, and £2 
billion under the $80, 70 pence case. 
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Chart 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
 
Cumulative Triggered Operating Expenditure to 2035 
£m (2008) 
 
Fields  $40, 30 pence $60, 50 pence $80, 70pence 
Probable 153.38 216.68 33.62 
Possible 32.96 15.48 0.00 
Technical Reserves 328.18 1763.12 1970.00 
New Discoveries 2337.74 1756.09 0.00 
TOTAL 2852.26 3751.37 2003.62 
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(e) Changes to Tax Revenues 
 
The budget tax changes have consequences for the aggregate tax revenues 
received from the UKCS.  Thus all new field development and operating 
expenditures can be relieved for CT and SC at 50% rate with no field ring 
fence restrictions.  The taxable income in eligible fields is reduced by the 
value allowance.  The value allowance being fixed impacts progressively 
in the sense that it shelters a higher proportion of profits from SC when 
they are reduced from either lower income or higher costs.  
Correspondingly, when oil/gas prices increase or costs are reduced a 
lower proportion of profits is sheltered from SC.  For fields whose 
development is induced the initial impact will be extra tax reliefs for both 
CT and SC.  This is followed by extra receipts of CT and SC when the 
induced production generates extra profits.  But fields which would in 
any case be developed in the absence of the allowance for SC also benefit 
from it and pay less SC.  This gives rise to a deadweight loss of SC 
revenues.  The net effect is the result of all the above effects. 
 
The multiple effects and the net outcome in terms of the change in total 
tax revenues (CT + SC) are shown in Chart 28 for the various categories 
of fields under the $40, 30 pence case.  It is seen in the solid line that 
there is a small net loss of total tax revenues over the period to 2035.  The 
change in total CT revenues is shown in Chart 29 where the net positive 
effect is clear.  In Chart 30 the net impact on SC alone is shown.  Under 
this low price scenario where profits are relatively low the net effect is 
clearly negative. 
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Chart 29 
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Chart 30 
Change in Potential SCT
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In Chart 31 the various effects on total tax revenues are shown under the 
$60, 50 pence case.  The net impact on total tax payments is clearly 
negative.  In Chart 32 the effects on CT alone are shown.  It is seen that 
there are substantial net extra payments of CT.  In Chart 33 the effects on 
SC alone are shown.  The net impact is significantly negative. 
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Chart 32 
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Chart 33 
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In Chart 34 the various effects of on total tax revenues are shown under 
the $80, 70 pence case.  There is a substantial net loss of overall tax 
revenues.  This results from the fact that many new fields were viable 
under the pre-budget tax terms.  In Chart 35 the effects on CT alone are 
shown.  The net effect is seen to be positive.  In Chart 36 the effect on SC 
revenues alone is seen to be substantially negative reflecting the fact that 
the triggered fields were mostly viable on pre-budget tax terms under this 
price scenario. 
 
It should be emphasised that the induced extra activity all emanates from 
fields which are economically viable and remain subject to CT. 
 
 
 
Chart 34 
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Chart 35 
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Chart 36 
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(f) Tax Takes after Allowance for Small Fields 
 
The tax takes on fields qualifying for the benefits from the new allowance 
can be measured in various ways.  The allowance itself relates to 
qualifying fields but the existing allowances for field investment and 
operating costs may be utilised on a cross-field basis within the UKCS.  
In this section one possible measure of the tax take on fields receiving 
benefits from the allowance for small fields has been employed.  (It is 
acknowledged that others can reasonably be employed).  It is assumed 
that on qualifying fields the capital allowances relating to pre-production 
investment will be utilised against income from other fields, but those 
relating to post-production investment and operating costs are relieved 
against the income from the field in question.  The tax takes calculated on 
the above basis can also be shown in various ways, and, to emphasise the 
structural aspects, they are shown here in real terms, that is after taking 
account of inflation, but before further discounting for the cost of capital.  
The take is thus defined as the real tax payments as a percentage of the 
real pre-tax cash flows from the field.  In Chart 37 the position is shown 
for all future fields, including those receiving no benefits from the small 
fields allowance as well as qualifying ones, under the $40, 30 pence case.  
For those receiving no benefits the take remains at 50%.  For those fields 
to which the allowance applies the effective takes are seen to be 
substantially less, with many in the 15% - 30% range.  The variation in 
the percentage take is seen to be quite substantial.  This depends on (1) 
the extent to which field production income is sheltered by the new 
allowance, and (2) the importance of the tax relief on pre-production 
investment in relation to the subsequent taxable income.  The results in 
Charts 37 and 38 show the tax takes in relation to the NPV/I ratios.  
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Broadly speaking it is seen that the effective tax takes decrease as the 
NPV/I ratio decreases: the relief is very mildly progress in its impact.  
Chart 38 shows the triggered fields only, and, on the methodology 
followed, it is seen that the level of take is quite low. 
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Chart 38 
Real Tax Take from Triggered Fields
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In Chart 39 the tax takes on all future fields are shown under the $60, 50 
pence case.  Again many fields continue to face a tax rate of 50%, but 
others face substantially lower rates, with many in the 20% - 30% range.  
In Chart 40 the rates on the triggered fields are isolated.  The effective tax 
rates are mostly relatively low, but the range is quite wide.  Broadly 
speaking the effective tax rates are mildly progressive in relation to field 
profitability as measured by the NPV/I ratios. 
 
Chart 39 
Real Tax Take @ 10% 2009 onwards
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Chart 40 
Real Tax Take from Triggered Fields
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In Chart 41 the tax takes under the $80, 70 pence scenario are shown for 
all new fields.  It is seen that, while many fields remain subject to the 
50% rate, large numbers have effective rates well below this level.  
Broadly, the impact of the new allowance is seen to be mildly progressive 
in relation to field profitability as measured by the NPV/I ratio.  In Chart 
42 the tax rates facing the triggered fields are isolated.  They are 
relatively few in number because in this price scenario most new fields 
passed the economic hurdle under the pre-budget tax terms. 
 
 
 
Chart 41 
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Chart 42 
Real Tax Take from Triggered Fields
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(g) West of Shetlands 
 
Because of the interest in and problems involved in expediting new 
developments in the West of Shetland region it was felt useful to separate 
out the potential effects of the new allowance for small fields on activity 
there.  The results in terms of numbers of field developments triggered 
are shown in Tables 13 – 15 under the 3 oil/gas price scenarios.  It is seen 
that under the $40, 30 pence case (Table 13) 25 fields fail the economic 
hurdle under the pre-budget terms but they also fail after the introduction 
of the £75 million allowance.  Under the $60, 50 pence case (Table 14) 
15 fields fail the hurdle under the pre-budget terms and continue to do so 
after the £75 million allowance.  Under the $80, 70 pence case (Table 15) 
the great majority of fields pass the economic hurdle under the pre-budget 
terms.  One further development is triggered by the £75 million 
allowance.  It is likely that for price scenarios between $60, 50 pence and 
$80, 70 pence the allowance could trigger further developments. 
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Table 13 
Potential new Field Developments in WoS 2009 – 2035 
$40, 30 pence case 
 Pass Pre-Budget 
‘09 
Fail Pre-Budget 
‘09 
Triggered by 
£75m. value 
allowance 
Probable 0 1 0 
Possible 0 0 0 
Technical 
Reserves 
0 17 0 
New Discoveries 1 7 0 
TOTAL 1 25 0 
 
Table 14 
Potential new Field Developments in WoS 2009 – 2035 
$60, 50 pence case 
 Pass Pre-Budget 
‘09 
Fail Pre-Budget 
‘09 
Triggered by 
£75m. value 
allowance 
Probable 1 0 0 
Possible 0 0 0 
Technical 
Reserves 
12 14 0 
New Discoveries 8 1 0 
TOTAL 21 15 0 
 
Table 15 
Potential new Field Developments in WoS 2009 – 2035 
$80, 70 pence case 
 Pass Pre-Budget 
‘09 
Fail Pre-Budget 
‘09 
Triggered by 
£75m. value 
allowance 
Probable 1 0 0 
Possible 0 0 0 
Technical 
Reserves 
25 3 1 
New Discoveries 9 0 0 
TOTAL 35 3 1 
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C.    Effects of Allowance for Ultra Heavy Oil Fields 
 
With the data base available to the present authors it is not clear how 
many fields would qualify for the ultra heavy oil fields allowance.  It was 
decided to test the effects of the £800 million allowance on a set of 12 
fields which might qualify for it.  The results under the $40, 30 pence 
case were that nearly all the fields failed the hurdle under both the pre-
budget and post-budget terms with no extra developments being 
triggered.  Under the $60, 50 pence case a small majority of the fields 
passed the hurdle under pre-budget terms and one development was 
triggered by the allowance.  Under the $80, 70 pence case 11 out of 12 
fields passed the hurdle under pre-budget terms.  It is thus possible that 
within the price range $60, 50 pence ― $80, 70 pence the £800 million 
allowance has stronger effects2.  
 
D.    Effects of Allowance for Ultra HP/HT Fields 
 
It is understood that only 1 present discovery qualifies under the very 
stringent twin criteria relating to temperature and pressure in the budget 
proposals.  It is also understood that several other fields would qualify if 
the criteria were made less stringent and/or only one of the two criteria 
had to be met. 
                                                 
2 The effects of the allowance for heavy oil fields on tax revenues are not shown here but can be 
obtained from the authors 
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E.    General Effects of Other Budget Proposals 
 
The effects of the budget proposals regarding capital gains taxation 
should be significantly positive for activity in the UKCS.  Some licensees 
are willing to sell or swap assets which are deemed to be non-core to their 
own portfolios to other players to whom they may be more valuable.  
Mature fields constitute the main examples.  Currently there is the 
possibility of capital gains tax applying to the transaction, though this can 
be postponed for 10 years if the proceeds are reinvested. 
 
By providing that, when the proceeds from disposals are reinvested in the 
UKCS, no chargeable gain arises, a significant hurdle to such transactions 
has been removed.  As the UKCS matures it can be expected that there 
will be further scope for such asset transactions.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The tax proposals in Budget 2009 provide evidence that the UK 
Government appreciates that tax incentives are required to produce 
maximum economic recovery from the UKCS.  The new field allowance 
for small fields could trigger the development of around 50 new fields 
under a $60, 50 pence price scenario in the period to 2035, and over 40 
under a $40, 30 pence price scenario.  Lower numbers would be triggered 
under an $80, 70 pence price case because most fields would be viable 
under the pre-budget terms.  The cumulative extra production triggered to 
2035 could be nearly 440 million barrels of oil equivalent (mmboe) under 
the $40, 30 pence case, and 360 mmboe under the $60, 50 pence case.  
Triggered field investments in the period could be £3.5 billion (at 2008 
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prices) under the $40, 30 pence case and £4.3 billion under the $60, 50 
pence case.  Triggered field operating costs could be £2.85 billion under 
the low price case and £3.75 billion under the medium price case.  These 
effects on activity in the UKCS may be described as modest but very 
worthwhile. 
 
In the West of Shetlands region it was found that the allowance for small 
fields did not have a significant effect in enhancing activity, but it is 
possible that within the price scenarios of $60, 50 pence ― $80, 70 pence 
the effects could be stronger.  It is also quite possible that a larger 
allowance applicable to all new developments in the West of Shetlands 
region would have a stronger effect.  Given the special difficulties of 
developing new fields in this region due to the particularly high costs and 
lack of adequate infrastructure there is merit in considering a larger 
allowance applicable to all new fields for this frontier region. 
 
With respect to heavy oil fields the modelling found that the field 
allowance had a modest effect in triggering new developments.  It is 
possible, however, that within the price range $60, 50 pence ― $80, 70 
pence the effect could be significantly stronger. 
 
With respect to HP/HT fields the effects of the new allowance will be 
tiny because only one discovery is understood to qualify.  Given that 
there are worthwhile numbers of (very high cost) fields generally 
regarded as falling within the HP/HT category there is merit in making 
the qualifying criteria less stringent.  Thus the qualification could readily 
be HP or HT rather than both HP/HT.  Consideration should also be given 
to modifying the specific pressures and temperatures to acknowledge the 
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need for further incentives to facilitate the development of these very 
difficult reservoirs. 
 
The proposed changes to capital gains taxation should have a positive and 
worthwhile effects in reducing impediments to asset transactions.  The 
facilitation of asset transactions is widely recognised as being helpful to 
the attainment of maximum economic recovery from the UKCS. 
 
Budget 2009 did not address all the current taxation issues currently 
encountered in the UKCS.  The most pressing other issue relates to 
incremental projects in mature PRT-paying fields.  Currently these are 
subject to an overall tax rate of 75%.  The discrimination against such 
projects compared to those in new fields has been increased as a 
consequence of the new field allowances.  But the potential contribution 
of these projects to total economic recovery from the UKCS is 
substantial.  This is clearly seen from Table 6 above.  Further, recent 
modelling by the present authors clearly shows that the presence of PRT 
and CT/SC can discoverage investment in incremental projects.3  While 
the case for early abolition of PRT (such as with a buy-out scheme) 
remains strong (and would greatly encourage the development of 
incremental projects), a targeted PRT investment relief could also 
enhance incentives to a worthwhile extent.  A PRT uplift for all 
incremental projects is an obvious incentive within the spirit of this tax, 
and there is a clear case for considering it. 
 
                                                 
3 For details see A G Kemp and L Stephen, “Incentivising Investment in the UKCS: a Response to 
Supporting Investment: a Consultation on the North Sea Fiscal Regime, North Sea Study Occasional 
Paper No. 111, by A.G. Kemp and Linda Stephen, University of Aberdeen Department of Economics, 
February 2009, pp. 93. 
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Budget 2009 did not contain specific new incentives for players without 
immediate tax cover.  The financial crisis has made it much more difficult 
for such licensees to raise external funds whether debt or equity.  They 
are clearly disadvantaged compared to licensees who have tax cover and 
can obtain early relief for their expenditures.  There is a case for making 
the playing field level, given the growing importance of new players to 
actively in the UKCS.  If the Government directly shared in the costs of 
exploration as is done in Norway the result could be a worthwhile 
increase in exploration at relatively low cost to the Government.  
Currently, exploration has dropped to a worrying extent and an incentive 
to players without tax cover perhaps for a specific, limited time period 
could help to reverse the recent sharp decline. 
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